Incentive for adoption of new technology in duopoly under absolute and relative profit maximization by Hattori, Masahiko & Tanaka, Yasuhito
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Incentive for adoption of new technology
in duopoly under absolute and relative
profit maximization
Masahiko Hattori and Yasuhito Tanaka
4. September 2014
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/59069/
MPRA Paper No. 59069, posted 4. October 2014 00:22 UTC
Incentive for adoption of new technology
in duopoly under absolute and relative
profit maximization
Masahiko Hattori
Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University,
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan.
and
Yasuhito Tanaka
Faculty of Economics, Doshisha University,
Kamigyo-ku, Kyoto, 602-8580, Japan.
Abstract
We present an analysis about adoption of new technology by firms in a duopoly with
differentiated goods under absolute and relative profit maximization. Technology itself
is free, but each firm must expend a fixed set-up cost, for example, for education of its
staff. Under absolute profitmaximization there are three types of sub-game perfect equi-
libria depending on the value of set-up cost. Both firms, or one firm, or no firm adopt
new technology. On the other hand, under relative profit maximization there are two
sub-game perfect equilibria. Both firms, or no firm adopt new technology. Andwe show
that if demand is sufficiently high, it is more probable that both firms adopt new tech-
nology under relative profit maximization than that both firms, or one firm adopt new
technology under absolute profit maximization.
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1
1 Introduction
We present an analysis about adoption of new technology by firms in a duopoly with differ-
entiated goods under absolute and relative profitmaximization. Technology itself is free, but
each firmmust expend a fixed set-up cost, for example, for education of its staff.
For analyses of relative profit maximization please see Gibbons and Murphy (1990), Lu
(2011), Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013), Satoh and Tanaka (2013), Satoh and
Tanaka (2014), Schaffer (1989), Tanaka (2013a), Tanaka (2013b) andVega-Redondo (1997)1.
We think that seeking for relative profit or utility is based on the human nature. Even if a
personearnsbigmoney, he is not happyenoughandmaybedisappointed, if his brother/sister
or close friend earns bigger money. On the other hand, even if he is very poor and his neigh-
bor is poorer, he may be consoled by that fact. Also firms in an industry do not only seek to
improve their own performance but also want to outperform their rival firms. TV audience-
rating race and market share competition by breweries, automobile manufacturers, conve-
nience store chains and mobile-phone carriers, especially in Japan, are examples of such be-
havior of firms.
We consider the following two stage-game.
1. The first stage: Each firm decides whether it adopts new technology or not.
2. The second stage: Each firm determines the level of its output.
Under absolute profit maximization there are three types of sub-game perfect equilibria de-
pending on the value of set-up cost. Both firms, or one firm, or no firm adopt new technol-
ogy. On the other hand, under relative profit maximization there are two sub-game perfect
equilibria. Both firms, or no firm adopt new technology. And we show that if demand is suf-
ficiently high, it is more probable that both firms adopt new technology under relative profit
maximization than that both firms, or one firm adopt new technology under absolute profit
maximization. In the last paragraph we consider a case where the set-up costs for the firms
are different. Then, there are three types of sub-game perfect equilibria under relative profit
maximization. Two, or one or no firm adopt new technology2.
1In Vega-Redondo (1997) it was shown that the equilibrium in a Cournot oligopoly with a homogeneous
good under relative profit maximization is equivalent to the competitive equilibrium. But the equilibrium
in a Cournot oligopoly with differentiated goods under relative profit maximization is not equivalent to the
competitive equilibrium.
In Satoh andTanaka (2014) andTanaka (2013a) it was shown that in a duopoly under relative profitmax-
imizationCournot equilibrium andBertrand equilibrium are equivalent both in symmetric and asymmetric
cases.
2The theme of Matsumura, Matsushima and Cato (2013) is close to that of our research. It explains the rela-
tionship between the competitiveness, which is expressed by the weight of relative profit in the objective
function of a firm, and R&D expenditure in oligopoly market. It considers continuous choice of investment
levels, but our research deals with selection between adoption and non-adoption of new technology and
compare the relative and absolute profit maximizing, and we have an interest in technology transfer rather
than R&D expenditure.
2 Themodel
Two firms, Firm A and B, produce differentiated goods, and consider adoption of new tech-
nology from a foreign country. Technology itself is free, but each firm must expend a fixed
set-up cost, for example, for education of its staff. Denote the outputs of Firm A and B by xA
and xB , the prices of their goods by pA and pB . The inverse demand functions of the goods
are
pA D a   xA   bxB ; pB D a   xB   bxA;
where a > 0 and 0 < b < 1. The marginal cost before adoption of new technology is c,
and the marginal cost after adoption of new technology is zero. A fixed set-up cost is e. We
assume a > c
1 b so that the absolute profit of each firm should be positive.
We compare the incentive of the firms to adopt new technology when the firms maximize
their absolute profits and the incentive when they maximize their relative profits.
We assume that if adoption of new technology and non-adoption are indifferent, then the
firms adopt new technology.
3 Absolute profit maximization
The profits of Firm A and B before adoption of new technology are
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cxA; B D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cxB :
After adoption of new technology they are
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   e; B D .a   xB   bxA/xB   e:
We assume Cournot type behavior of firms.
The conditions for profit maximization in the second stage when both firms adopt new
technology are
a   2xA   bxB D 0; a   2xB   bxA D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D xB D a
2C b :
The profits of the firms are
A D B D a
2
.2C b/2   e:
The conditions for profit maximization when only Firm B adopts new technology are
a   2xA   bxB   c D 0; a   2xB   bxA D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D .2   b/a   2c
4   b2 ; xB D
.2   b/aC bc
4   b2 :
The profits of the firms are as follows.
A D .2   b/a   2c
2
.4   b2/2 ; B D
.2   b/aC bc2
.4   b2/2   e:
Similarly, the profits of the firms when only Firm A adopts new technology are
A D .2   b/aC bc
2
.4   b2/2   e; B D
.2   b/a   2c2
.4   b2/2 :
The conditions for profit maximization when no firm adopts new technology are
a   2xA   bxB   c D 0; a   2xB   bxA   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D xB D a   c
2C b :
The profits of the firms are
A D B D .a   c/
2
.2C b/2 :
If
a2
.2C b/2   e 
.2   b/a   2c2
.4   b2/2 ;
the optimal response of each firm when the rival firm adopts new technology is adoption of
new technology. Then, we have
e  4c.2   b/a   c
.4   b2/2 :
If
.2   b/aC bc2
.4   b2/2   e 
.a   c/2
.2C b/2 ;
the optimal response of each firmwhen the rival firmdoes not adopt new technology is adop-
tion of new technology. Then, we have
e  4c.2   b/a   .1   b/c
.4   b2/2 :
Since 4c.2 b/a .1 b/c
.4 b2/2 >
4c.2 b/a c
.4 b2/2 , we get the following proposition.
Proposition 1. Under absolute profit maximization the sub-game perfect equilibria of the two-
stage game are as follows.
1. If e  4c.2 b/a c
.4 b2/2 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms adopt
new technology.
2. If 4c.2 b/a c
.4 b2/2 < e  4c.2 b/a .1 b/c.4 b2/2 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such
that one firm, Firm A or B, adopts new technology.
3. If e > 4c.2 b/a .1 b/c
.4 b2/2 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that no firm
adopts new technology.
4 Relative profit maximization
We denote the relative profits of Firm A and B byA andB .
When both firms adopt new technology, we have
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   e   .a   xB   bxA/xB C e;
and
B D  A D .a   xB   bxA/xB   e   .a   xA   bxB/xA C e:
The conditions for relative profit maximization are
a   2xA D 0; a   2xB D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D xB D a
2
:
The prices of the goods are
pA D pB D .1   b/a
2
:
The absolute profits of the firms are as follows.
A D B D .1   b/a
2
4
  e:
The relative profits of the firms are
A D B D 0:
When no firm adopts new technology, we have
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   cxA   .a   xB   bxA/xB C cxB ;
and
B D  A D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cxB   .a   xA   bxB/xA C cxA:
The conditions for relative profit maximization are
a   2xA   c D 0; a   2xB   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D xB D a   c
2
:
The prices of the goods are
pA D pB D .1   b/aC .1C b/c
2
:
The absolute profits of the firms are as follows.
A D B D .1   b/.a   c/
2
4
:
The relative profits of the firms are
A D B D 0:
When only Firm A adopts new technology, we have
A D .a   xA   bxB/xA   e   .a   xB   bxA/xB C cxB ;
and
B D  A D .a   xB   bxA/xB   cxB   .a   xA   bxB/xA C e:
The conditions for relative profit maximization are
a   2xA D 0; a   2xB   c D 0:
The equilibrium outputs are
xA D a
2
; xB D a   c
2
:
The prices of the goods are
pA D .1   b/aC bc
2
; pB D .1   b/aC c
2
:
The absolute profits of the firms are as follows.
A D a.1   b/aC bc
4
  e;
and
B D .a   c/.1   b/a   c
4
:
The relative profits of the firms are
A D a.1   b/aC bc
4
  .a   c/.1   b/a   c
4
  e D c.2a   c/
4
  e;
and
B D  c.2a   c/
4
C e:
By the assumption that a > c
1 b the absolute profit of each firm is positive. If e <
c.2a c/
4
,
we haveA > 0 andB < 0, if e > c.2a c/4 , we haveA < 0 andB > 0. If e D c.2a c/4 ,
A D B D 0. When only Firm B adopts new technology, we obtain the converse results.
The game in the first stage is depicted as follows.
B
adoption of
new technology non-adoption
A adoption ofnew technology 0, 0
c.2a c/
4
  e, c.2a c/
4
C e
non-adoption  c.2a c/
4
C e, c.2a c/
4
  e 0, 0
From this table we get the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Under relative profit maximization the sub-game perfect equilibria of the two-
stage game are as follows.
1. If e  c.2a c/
4
, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms adopt new
technology
2. If e > c.2a c/
4
, the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state such that no firm adopts new
technology.
Note that in the case of absolute profit maximization if e < 4c.2 b/a c
.4 b2/2 , the sub-game
perfect equilibrium is a state such that both firms adopt new technology. Comparing c.2a c/
4
with 4c.2 b/a c
.4 b2/2 yields
c.2a   c/
4
  4c.2   b/a   c
.4   b2/2 D
2abc.8   8b C b3/C b2c2.8   b2/
4.4   b2/2 > 0:
Comparing c.2a c/
4
with 4c.2 b/a .1 b/c
.4 b2/2 yields
c.2a   c/
4
  4c.2   b/a   .1   b/c
.4   b2/2 D
2abc.8   8b C b3/C bc2.8b   b3   16/
4.4   b2/2 :
By the assumption that a > c
1 b
c.2a   c/
4
  4c.2   b/a   .1   b/c
.4   b2/2 >
b2c2.8   8b C b2 C b3/
4.1   b/.4   b2/2 > 0:
Thus, we obtain the following results.
Proposition 3. 1. In a duopoly, it is more probable that both firms adopt new technology
under relative profit maximization than that both firms adopt new technology under ab-
solute profit maximization.
2. In a duopoly, it is more probable that both firms adopt new technology under relative profit
maximization than that one firm adopts new technology under absolute profit maximiza-
tion.
Different set-up costs As a referencewe consider a casewhere the set-up costs of the firms
are different. Denote the set-up costs of FirmA andB by eA and eB , and assume eB eA > 0.
Then, the game is depicted as follows.
B
adoption of
new technology non-adoption
A adoption ofnew technology eB   eA, eA   eB
c.2a c/
4
  eA, c.2a c/4 C eA
non-adoption  c.2a c/
4
C eB , c.2a c/4   eB 0, 0
If c.2a c/
4
  eA  0, the strategy to adopt new technology is a dominant strategy for Firm A,
and if c.2a c/
4
  eA < 0, the strategy not to adopt new technology is a dominant strategy for
Firm A. Similarly, if c.2a c/
4
  eB  0, the strategy to adopt new technology is a dominant
strategy for Firm B, and if c.2a c/
4
  eB < 0, the strategy not to adopt new technology is a
dominant strategy for Firm B. Since eB > eA, the sub-game perfect equilibria are as follows.
1. If eB  c.2a c/4 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where both firms adopt
new technology.
2. If eA < c.2a c/4  eB , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where only Firm A
adopts new technology.
3. If eA > c.2a c/4 , the sub-game perfect equilibrium is a state where no firm adopts new
technology.
5 Concluding Remarks
In the future research we would like to analyze economic welfare relating to technology
adoption by firms and the optimal policies by the government to subsidize or tax adoption
of new technology, in particular, under relative profit maximization.
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